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PROSECUTION FOR UTILITY METER
TAMPERING: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
ON STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
In recent years, revenue losses incident to utility service thefts have
increased as a result of meter tampering.' States' attorneys and util-
ity company management have been unable to curb the problem
through criminal prosecutions2 due to mens rea requirements. Inclu-
sion of a mens rea element makes it more difficult to obtain sufficient
evidence of the crime's commission by any particular individual. 3
Attempting to alleviate this problem, some state legislatures have
passed laws that use statutory presumptions4 to infer the criminal in-
I. Utility service thefts refer to crimes involving tampered meters. Meter altera-
tions cause the meter to inaccurately register the consumption rate of utility services.
As a result, the dishonest consumer benefits by receiving more utility services than the
amount billed. See Law & Osterhus, Are You Getting Mugged at Your Meters? 101
PuB. UTIL. FORT. 14 (May I1, 1978).
The C.B.S. television program, "60 Minutes," estimated that three billion dollars of
electric power has been stolen. Predictions indicate that this figure will increase to
four-and-one-half billion dollars by the end of 1979. These figures do not include
theft of output from other types of utilities such as gas, water or related services that
are also distributed at an unmanned point of sale. Id. at 14. "Few crimes. . . are so
lucrative in comparison to the potential penalties." Id. at 15.
2. It is often impossible to prove a consumer's participation in the crime by direct
evidence. Therefore, the prosecutor needs the aid of presumptions. State v. Curtis,
148 N.J. Super. 235, 240, 372 A.2d 612, 615, cert. denied, 75 N.J. 22, 379 A.2d 253
(1977); People v. McLaughlin, 93 Misc. 2d 980, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1978).
3. Typically, it is difficult to obtain any evidence relating to defendant's subjective
mental state. Although defendant is in the best position to have knowledge of his own
criminal intent, constitutional protections prohibit the prosecutor from examining the
defendant at trial. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Chamberlain, Presump-
tions as FirstAid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A. J. 287 (1928). Cf. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1343
n.41 (1971) (compiling sufficient evidence of intent to prove the intent element of
arson is impossible).
4. Presumptions assert the existence of one fact, B, from the existence of another
fact, A; they are legislative rules of evidence. Legal scholars disagree on the operation
and procedural effects of presumptions. See Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, As-
sumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases .4 Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J.
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tent element, 5 thereby diminishing the prosecutorial burden and fa-
cilitating conviction.6 The U.S. Constitution, however, limits
165 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ashford & Risinger]. A basic overview of the concept
follows.
The commonly recognized forms of presumptions include inferences, prima facie
presumptions, mandatory presumptions, and conclusive presumptions. Inferences al-
low proof of fact A to constitute some evidence of B, the presumed fact. Prima facie,
or permissive presumptions, permit proof of fact A to constitute sufficient evidence of
B, unless defendant can rebut B. Many authorities believe that all criminal presump-
tions are, or should be, this type. See Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. 277 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Soules]; Note, The Unconstitutionality
of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Criminal Presumptions].
Under mandatory presumptions, proof of fact A sufficiently establishes B unless
defendant rebuts B. Conclusive presumptions operate similarly but do not permit
rebuttal. Several authorities do not consider conclusive presumptions to be true pre-
sumptions; rather, they classify them as rules of substantive law. For a general discus-
sion, see Christie & Pye, Presumptions and.4ssumptions in the Criminal Law" ,4nother
View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919 [hereinafter cited as Christie & Pye]; Soules, supra at 278;
Criminal Presumptions, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presump-
tions, 34 U. CM. L. REv. 141 (1966).
To avoid the obviously prejudicial effects on the jury's determination, the defend-
ant must rebut the presumption. When sufficiently rebutted, the presumption no
longer operates. Different theories exist to explain how rebuttal takes place. Rebuttal
must convince the jury that either: 1) B's nonexistence is possible; or 2) B's nonexis-
tence is just as likely as that of B; or 3) not-B's existence is more probable than that of
B; or 4) not-B's existence constitutes an affirmative defense since the presumption
redefines the elements of the crime (formerly A, B, C, and D) to require only the
elements A, C, and D. See United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); Ashford &
Risinger, supra at 194; Note, Abrogation of Statutory Presumptions, 5 SUFFOLK L.
REv. 161, 166 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Abrogation ofPresumptions].
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 812.14 (Supp. 1979) (declared unconstitutional in Mac-
Millan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-170-64 (West
1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(5) (McKinney 1978-79 Supplementary Practice
Commentaries). Contra, Soules, supra note 4, at 282 (Texas law forbids the use of
mandatory presumptions).
Even without the presumption, some states have allowed circumstantial evidence to
constitute a sufficient case against the defendant for meter tampering. See State v.
Rousten, 84 N.H. 140, 146 A. 870 (1929) (conviction for meter tampering may be
sustained upon circumstantial proof that defendant tampered with his meter on prior
occasions, benefited from the tampering, and controlled the premises on which the
tampering occurred). Contra, Rugg v. State 141 Tenn. 362, 371, 210 S.W. 630, 633
(1919) (proof that defendant's meter had been tampered insufficient for conviction;
actual tampering by the defendant must be shown). Most states still include "intent to
tamper" as an element of the crime. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 381 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. 97 § 3 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-151.1 (1969).
6. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 65 (1965); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality of Statutory Presumptions, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 141, 142 (1966). When it is
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legislative authority to create such presumptions7 despite the benefi-
difficult to produce sufficient evidence, the need for presumptions is particularly great.
Soules, i-upra note 4, at 278.
The defendant's need to rebut the presumption shifts prosecutorial procedural bur-
den. of going forward with evidence to defendant. The procedure may even affect the
burden of persuasion. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 4, at 171. Procedural
shifts such as these have profound effects on the trial. They increase the probative
weight of the state's case and thus influence the jury's decision. It is likely that ajury
will assume the Validity of a presumption, even though not mandatory, where there
are no additional indicators of the presumed fact's existence or nonexistence. Not
surprisingly, indicators of intent are rarely available. See Soules, supra note 4, at 285-
86: Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the Sac-
rosani. 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 157, 160 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Presump-
llonvi
Other rationales for employing legislative presumptions include: judicial economy,
since the state will not have to prove the existence of the presumed fact; comparative
convenience, since defendant may be in a better position to produce relevant evi-
dence, and consistent results, since presumptions ensure that, given similar fact pat-
terns. B is not inferred by one jury and denied by another. Statutory Presumptions,
vupra. at 179.
7. To protect defendants from unwarranted punishment, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees procedural safeguards, See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55
(1969) (Black, J., concurring) (defendant can only be convicted by ajury having suffi-
cient evidence to infer guilt). Cf Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940)
(Fourteenth Amendment protects accused from abuse by those holding positions of
power and authority).
Five additional constitutional safeguards relate to this problem: 1) due process
rights require sufficient connection between the proved and presumed facts; 2) Sixth
Amendment rights to trial by jury may preclude a legislature from dictating the
weight certain evidence receives (not applied to states through Fourteenth Amend-
ment). 3) Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination may be infringed upon
when defendant shoulders the burden of going forward and must give up the right to
remain silent or face conviction; 4) the proscription against making any comment on
defendant's failure to testify may be undercut; and 5) the right to confront witnesses
may be %iolated since the state is not required to present any witnesses or evidence to
prose the sufficiency of a presumption. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837,
850 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting): United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 72-74
(1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the constitutional limita-
tions of criminal presumptions. see Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Pre-
fiHPptIonv, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1955).
Traditionally, the legislature has evoked the authority to create presumptions. The
legislature, positioned as the fact-finding branch of government, is well suited for this
task due to its representative views and investigatory powers. See Soules, supra note
4. at 295. Cf Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893) (rules of
evidence confer legislative authority to create presumptions). Contra, United States
(.iamey, 380 U.S 63, 82 (Black, J., dissenting) (constitutional requirements do not
permit the legislature to create presumptions in violation of due process; the authority
to establish presumptions is not absolute).
1 98u]
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cial functions they serve in controlling crime. In MacMillan v. Slate,8
the Florida Supreme Court declared a meter-tampering statute based
on a prima facie presumption of intent unconstitutional as violative
of due process.
9
In recognition of the foregoing prosecutorial needs, Florida en-
acted a statutory presumption to control meter-tampering crimes.' 0
The presumption of intent to steal operated whenever the prosecution
showed that the accused benefited from diverted utility services."
Although the defendant in MacMillan possessed a tampered meter
and benefited from free utility services, the Florida Supreme Court
reversed his conviction.' 2 According to the court, reliance on the pre-
sumption violated defendant's rights since it failed to meet the "ra-
tional connection" or "more likely than not" standards of due
process. 13 Without use of the presumption, the prosecution was un-
able to prove the essential elements of the crime, such as actual tam-
8. 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978).
9. Id. at 549-50.
10. FLA. STAT. § 812.14 (Supp. 1979). This statute has also been applied to civil
cases for meter tampering. Id. § 812.14(5).
11. The Florida statute provided:
The existence, on property in the actual possession of the accused, of any...
meter alteration, . . . which effects the diversion or use of the service of a utility
or a cable television service or community antenna line service or the use of
electricity, gas, or water without the same being reported for payment as to serv-
ice or measured or registered by or on a meter installed or provided by the utility
shall beprimafacie evidence of intent to violate, and of the violation of, this section
by such accused. The use or receipt of the direct benefits from the use of electric-
ity,. . . derived from any tampering, .. shall be prima facie evidence of intent
to violate, and of the violation ...
Id. § 812.14(3) (emphasis added).
12. Evidence at trial established defendant's history of meter tampering. In July
1975, a utility company employee found a tampered meter on defendant's property.
Again on September 26, 1976, the employee discovered another tampered meter. On
November 9, 1976, the employee noted a third episode of altering the meter. Brief for
Appellant at 3-4, MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978). Judge Rubiera of
Dade County Court convicted defendant of tampering with his utility meter. Mac-
Millan received a sentence of 30 days in the county jail. The defendant obtained a
direct appeal to the state supreme court from the circuit court because of the constitu-
tional question. Id.
13. 358 So. 2d at 549. These tests are discussed at notes 16 and 23 and accompa-
nying text infra.
Although the court declared the presumption contained in § 812.14(3) unconstitu-
tional, the rest of the statute remains intact after MacMillan. Id. at 550. For subse-
quent legislative amendments, see note 69.
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pering or intent to tamper. 4
In Tot . United States,' 5 the United States Supreme Court dis-
cussed the relationship between proved and presumed facts. Under
the Tot test, due process demands a "rational connection" between
the proved fact and the presumed fact. 6 Acknowledging the empiri-
cal nature of this determination" and the legislature's authority as
the fact-finding branch of government,'" the Court used reason and
14. 358 So. 2d at 549 (cause was remanded for a new trial, however).
15, 319 US, 463 (1943).
16 Id. at 467. The rational connection test originally applied only to civil suits.
See McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916) (in civil cases,
presumptions are constitutional when rational connection test met); Mobile, J. & K.C.
RR. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910) (in dicta, the Court acknowledged applica-
tion of the rational connection standard in criminal proceedings if defendant received
a reasonable opportunity to submit his defense to the jury).
In 1925, the Supreme Court first applied the rational connection test to affirm a
criminal conviction. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 184 (1925). Borrowing
the civil standard "without an adequate sensitivity to the fundamental differences be-
tween civil and criminal cases" accounts for the inadequacy of the "rational connec-
tion" test in criminal cases. Statutory Presumptions, supra note 6, at 161. Cf. Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463,473 (1943) (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring) (in addi-
tion to a -'rational connection," due process requires proof of all elements of the crime
for conviction).
The procedural changes accompanying use of presumptions affect many of defend-
ant's rights in criminal cases which have no counterpart in civil litigation. See note 7
supra for a list of the constitutional rights involved. Defendant's right to have his
guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime presents the
greatest problems. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); notes 31-32 and accompa-
nying text infra. Juries may treat permissive presumptions as if they were mandatory
because thev lack contradictory evidence. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 4, at 204.
The "more likely than not" test deals with only a minor aspect of defendant's con-
stitutional rights. The Supreme Court has never clearly indicated the extent to which
presumptions will be allowed to affect the relative positions of the parties. Statutory
Presumptons, supra note 6, at 167. The Court consistently considers several different
constitutional rights under the due process label. See note 7 and accompanying text
supra. Limited to due process analyses, the Court has adopted the "more likely than
not" standard to satisfy these diverse rights. Ignoring the variant nature of these con-
stitutional rights, the Supreme Court has failed to consider other tests which would
more adequately protect these rights. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 79 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting) (rationality is only the first "constitutional hurdle;" additional
standards are necessary); Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973). See also
Statutory Presumptions. supra note 6, at 167.
17. Lear), v. United States, 395 US. 6. 38 (1969).
18. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965). The presumption of
illegal activity derived from the accused's presence at a still reflected the legislative
determination that the "implications of seclusion [only] confirm[s] what the folklore
teaches-that strangers to the illegal business fliquor manufacture] rarely penetrate
the curtain of secrecy." Id. at 67-68.
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common experience to determine whether the connection was ra-
tional. 9 Ultimately, the Court deferred to the legislature's superior
capacity "to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions
from it."2
A subsequent test of due process, the "more likely than not" test,
emerged in Leary v. United States2' to clarify application of the ra-
19. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
A corollary to the "rational connection" requirement is the "comparative conven-
ience" test. When first adopted, the convenience test justified statutory presumptions
by allowing the burden of going forward to shift whenever the defendant had better
access to the evidence than the prosecutor. See Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S.
178 (1925). Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 65 (1965) (if the legislative
record indicates that Congress enacted legislation because of the "practical impossi-
bility" of proving actual participation absent an inference, then the inference is ra-
tional). See generall, Criminal Presumptions, supra note 4, at 344.
Convenience may influence the constitutionality of a presumption. This occurs,
however, only when the presumption is permissive and defendant's convenient access
to the proof does not subject him to unfairness or hardship when required to go for-
ward with the evidence. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468-70 (1943).
Convenience alone does not justify the prejudicial effect of presumptions in crimi-
nal proceedings. In a civil tort suit, shifting the burden of going forward to the party
best able to produce the necessary facts protects injured victims who do not have
access to the required evidence. See Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 84 (1934).
For example, the doctrine of res psa loquitur shifts the burden to the defendant and
thus allows innocent plaintiffs the chance to recover damages by preventing a directed
verdict in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Ristau v. E. Frank Coe Co., 120 App. Div.
478, 104 N.Y.S. 1059 (1907). In Ristau, plaintiff presented evidence of a collapsed
trestle that had allegedly injured him. That evidence was sufficient to shift the burden
to defendant to prove he was not negligent in allowing that condition to occur. Plain-
tiff was in no position to assert whether defendant had exercised due care.
In a criminal case, the procedural considerations are different. The defendant is
innocent until proven guilty; however, when presumptions shift the burden upon the
defendant, the presumption of innocence is denied. Even if the presumption is per-
missible, it weights heavily upon the jury determination. See Statutory Presunmtions,
supra note 6, at 161, 185.
Justice Black's awareness of this problem appears in his dissent in United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 78-80 (1965). Acknowledging the validity of the presumption of
death after seven years' absence for use in civil suits, he simultaneously denied its
validity as proof of the corpus delicti of a criminal charge such as murder. He feared
punishment on the basis of a presumption rather than upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of all elements of the offense. See note 35 and accompanying text infra.
20. 380 U.S. at 67. Accord, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 (1969). The
Lear Court temporally qualified its deference to legislative expertise: even if the
legislature conceived of a presumption which met the "rational connection" test at its
inception, it could later prove empirically invalid. 395 U.S. at 38 (evidence presented
to the legislative committee did not reflect the reality of the drug situation as the
Court perceived it at the time of its decision).
21. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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tional connection standard. Criminal presumptions, according to the
newer test, are irrational unless there is "substantial assurance" that
the presumed fact is "more likely than not" to flow from the proved
fact.22 The Court recognized the use of probability to assess a pre-
sumption's constitutionality in accordance with the more likely than
not standard. 23
In later applications of the more likely than not test to statutory
presumptions, the Supreme Court also discussed a stricter "reason-
able doubt" standard.24 The reasonable doubt test would allow the
Court to uphold a conviction based upon a presumption whenever a
rational juror could presume the fact beyond a reasonable doubt.25
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly accepted the rea-
sonable doubt standard,' 6 the Court's recognition of this stricter test
may be implicit in view of its In re Winsh 0 27 decision. Therein the
Court held that the prosecution must prove each element of the al-
22. Id. at 36.
23, Id. at 39, 46. Although the legislature found that 90% of all marijuana was
imported, the Supreme Court refused to apply the statutory presumption of knowing
possession of imported marijuana from mere possession of the drug. Because the sta-
tistic represented the probability of importation and not the probability of one's
knowledge. the Court reasoned that no rational connection existed between posses-
sion of the drug and knowledge of illicit importation. Id. Knowledge of the drug's
importation was not implicit from one's possession. As a method of substantiation,
the Court suggested that testimony from drug users regarding their knowledge of im-
portation would be relevant. Id. at 47, See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual m the Legal Process. 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971); Criminal Presumptions,
rupra note 4, at 352. See also Justice Douglas' dissent in Barnes v. United States, 412
U.S 837, 848-50 (1973), in which he follows the majority's holding in Leary and
reasons that mere possession of a stolen check does not allow the presumption that the
accused knew that the check had been stolen from the mail.
24. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973); Turner v. United
States. 396 U.S. 398, 408 (1970). In these cases, the Court noted that the presumptions
met the 'reasonable doubt" standard, thereby satisfying the less stringent "more
likely than not" test. See also Statutory Presumptions, supra note 6, at 171.
25. Lear) v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969).
26. The more likely than not test is still the current legal standard. Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 408 (1970); see 83 HARV. L. REV. 103, 108 (1969-70).
Yet, the Supreme Court has mentioned the "reasonable doubt" test in assessing the
constitutionality of a presumption and has referred to the standard as "the most strin-
gent standard the Court has applied in judging the permissive criminal law infer-
ences " Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 (1973); Turner v. United States,
396 U S. 398, 409 (1970).
27 397 US. 358, 361 (1970).
19801
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leged crime beyond a reasonable doubt.2 8
The Winship decision antedated the Court's dicta on the reason-
able doubt test in cases that turned on the more likely than not stan-
dard.29 Nevertheless, the Court has never defined the relationship
between the Winship requirement and the less stringent more likely
than not test.3 ° Clearly, though, a conviction based on the more
likely than not standard seems to violate Winship by allowing the
jury to presume an elemental fact which has not been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.3 Unless the court instructs a jury to employ the
presumption only when it also satisfies the "reasonable doubt" test,
violation of defendant's rights to procedural due process will occur.3 2
Consistent with the constitutional standards permitting presump-
tions, common law recognizes the validity of presuming intentional
possession from proof of unexplained possession.33 State courts have
28. Id. at 361 (first case to explicitly interpret the due process clause to require
this level of proof).
29. The Winship decision was handed down in 1970, id., whereas Barnes was a
1973 case, 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
30. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (relied on Turner but did not
cite Winship); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (decided prior to Winsho).
31. See Fitzgerald v. State, 339 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1976) (discussed Wnsh~o
explicitly).
32. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); Fitzgerald v. State, 339 So. 2d 209,
211 (Fla. 1976). Presumptions sway the jury despite instructions. The juror is likely
to assume the presumed fact without performing an independent determination based
on the reasonable doubt standard. Statutory Presumptions, supra note 6, at 169. The
Winship standard provides "substance for the presumption of innocence." Adjudging
the defendant by a lower standard than the reasonable doubt test puts the defendant
at a disadvantage and results in a deprivation of fundamental fairness. 397 U.S. at
363.
33. Since benefit usually adheres to one possessing stolen goods, it is logical to
infer the possessor's motive to break the law. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1973) (possession of stolen checks allows presumption of defendant's
knowledge that the checks were stolen); Adams v. New York, 129 U.S. 585, 599 (1904)
(possession of policy slips gives rise to presumption of defendant's knowing posses-
sion of them); Fitzgerald v. State, 339 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1976) (possession of a stolen
car permits the presumption of defendant's intent to steal it); State v. Curtis, 148 N.J.
Super. 235, 238, 372 A.2d 612,614 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 22,379 A.2d 253 (1977)
(possession of tampered meter allows presumption of defendant's intent to tamper).
The U.S. Constitution requires proof that defendant actually did something illegal;
proving the existence of a state of possession may therefore be insufficient. See Leary
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (proof of presence, while relevant and admissi-
ble as evidence, is insufficient to support a possessory conviction). Contra Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 851 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Christie &
Pye, supra note 4, at 925.
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expanded the common law theory to include the possession of in-
tangibles such as utility services.34 Exceptions to this presumption
arise when defendant's possession is nonexclusive; 35 however, courts
readily find exclusive possession if defendant owns the property on
which stolen property is found.36
The New York37 and New Jersey38 courts have upheld the consti-
tutionality of statutes that presume intent to alter a utility meter from
proof of possession of a tampered meter. According to interpreta-
tions by these state courts, the presumptions satisfy the rational con-
nection and more likely than not tests of due process.3 9 In the New
York case, People i'. McLaughlin,4 ° the state supreme court held that
the prima facie presumption was "inevitable.",4 1 Consequently, the
statutory presumption satisfied the reasonable doubt test.42
34. The common law theory encompassed only the possession of tangibles be-
cause only they were subject to physical possession. See People v. McLaughlin, -
Misc. 2d -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137, 144 (1978) (theft of utility services is a proper subject
of larceny despite its intangibility). See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley, 297
U S. 288 (1936) (electrical energy is personal property).
35. When others have an equal right and facility of access to property, nonexclu-
sive possession results. Lewis v. State, 181 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. 1965).
36. Id.
37. People v. McLaughlin, - Misc. 2d -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1978); Eff-Ess, Inc.
New York Edison Co., 237 App. Div. 315, 316-17, 261 N.Y.S. 126, 129 (1932).
38. State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 372 A.2d 612 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J.
22. 379 A.2d 253 (1977).
39. Id. People v. McLaughlin, - Misc. 2d -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137, 143 (1978). As
early as 1932, the New York court (Eff-Ess, Inc. v. New York Edison Co., 237 App.
Div 315, 316-17, 261 N.Y.S. 126, 129 (1932)) allowed the presumption of intent to
tamper with utility meters in both criminal and civil cases. The court found a "ra-
tional connection" between proof that defendant benefited from the stolen electricity
and the presumption of intent. Because it was "too clear to admit to serious ques-
tion." the opinion provided no reasoning for its conclusion. Interference with the
meter constituted the corpus delicti. 237 App. Div. 315, 316-17, 261 N.Y.S. 126, 129
(1932). For an opposing view of the constitutional propriety of the presumption, see
the dissent's argument in Eff-Ess. Id. at 318, 261 N.Y.S. at 130.
40 - Misc. 2d -, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 137 (1978) (relied on Eff-Ess).
41. Id. By doing this, the court implicitly rules out the possibility of vandalism.
4ccord, State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 335, 238-39, 372 A.2d 612, 615 (1977) (no
independent motivation existed in anyone other than the beneficiary).
To uphold convictions, presumptions "must exclude, to a moral certainty every rea-
sonable hypothesis except guilt." People v. McLaughlin, - Misc. 2d at -, 402
N Y.S.2d at 144. In State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 372 A.2d 612 (1977), the
court held that the constitutional validity of a presumption was "not dependent upon
its rationality as an absolute verity in every instance." Id. at 239, 372 A.2d at 615.
42. "And search as we may, we are unable to extract any reasonable hypothesis as
19:8H 1
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The New Jersey Superior Court reached a similar result in State P.
Curtis.43 The state's meter tampering presumption" is similar to that
of New York and Florida except for an additional provision. Under
this statute, the accused cannot be convicted by means of the pre-
sumption unless he received the stolen electricity for at least thirty-
one days or had his meter read since moving to the premises.4" Up-
holding the constitutionality of this statute, the court in State v. Curtis
found that the presumption met the more likely than not standard
when tested by "human conduct and experience."46 No violation of
defendant's procedural rights occurred since "all the normal accout-
rements of the burden of proof. . . prevail[edj;"47 the jury still had
to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.48
The MacMillan court,49 contrary to McLaughlin and Curtis, held
that due process constraints prohibited the statutory presumption of
intent to tamper with a utility meter. The Florida court reasoned that
according to common experience, neither the use or receipt of bene-
fits from stolen electricity, nor the existence of a tampered meter on
to why someone other than the subscriber himself would tamper with a meter so as to
deprive the supplier of its lawful charges." McLaughlin, - Misc. 2d at -, 402
N.Y.S.2d at 144. In their dissenting opinion in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837,
853 (1973), Justices Brennan and Marshall indicated that the reasonable doubt test is
met where the inference is inevitable.
43. 148 N.J. Super. 235, 372 A.2d 612 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 22, 379 A.2d 253
(1977).
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-170-63 (West 1971). In New Jersey, the crime is not
larceny, but a disorderly persons offense.
45. Id.
46. 148 N.J. Super. 235, 238-39, 372 A.2d 612, 614-15 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J.
22, 379 A.2d 253 (1977). The possibility that tampering was incident to vandalism or
other causes outside of defendant's control did not destroy the substantial probability
of the presumption's validity. According to the court's reasoning, no independent
motivation existed in anyone other than the beneficiary of the stolen electricity. Id.
In cases of accident, motive is not a significant factor. The mechanics of the meter,
however, make accidental alteration unlikely.
47. Id. Even with a prima facie presumption, the legislature cannot prevent the
jury from acquitting a defendant. The judicial branch, not the legislature, maintains
the ultimate authority to determine guilt. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63,
68 (1965).
48. 148 N.J. Super. 235, 238-39, 372 A.2d 612, 614-15 (1977), cert. denzied, 75 N.J.
22, 379 A.2d 253 (1977).
49. MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 1978). In its deletion of the
presumption in subsection 3 of § 812.14, FLA. STAT. (Supp. 1976), the Florida court
simultaneously extinguished the presumption in civil cases.
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one's property could sufficiently corroborate the presumption.50 The
MacMillan court purported to employ the rational connection and
more likely than not tests just as the courts had in Curtis and Mc-
Laughlin." Florida, however, applied these same standards to
achieve an opposite result. 2
The MacMillan court emphasized the nonexclusive nature of de-
fendant's possession of the tampered meter since it was situated in an
easily accessible location. 3 Although defendant possessed the tam-
pered meter and received free utility services, the court could not up-
hold defendant's conviction. The Florida court found it too easy to
posit situations in which defendant could be innocent.54 The New
York and New Jersey courts, however, dismissed the theory of
nonexclusivity, asserting that defendant's innocence was improbable
given the situation posed in the statute.5 Therefore, the unique im-
portance of nonexclusivity to the MacMillan court's analysis accounts
for its divergent approach despite the three state courts'56 explicit use
of identical constitutional standards.
50, 358 So. 2d at 550.
51 Id. at 549.
52 Id. "'We find that it cannot be said with substantial assurance that the pre-
sumed fact that defendant is guilty . . . is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact of possession of the premises or receipt of benefits."
53. Id at 550. Pranksters, angry neighbors or any occupant of the premises could
easily gain access to defendant's meter without defendant's notice or knowledge.
Notwithstanding. the presumption would operate to procure a guilty verdict and con-
viction
54 Id.
55. The mere possibility of defendant's innocence was not sufficient to overcome
the validity of an otherwise valid presumption. No motive would exist for anyone
other than defendant to tamper with the meter. State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235,
238, 372 A.2d 612, 614 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 22, 379 A.2d 253 (1977).
56. MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d at 550. Factual differences between the cases
of the three states may help to distinguish them. In addition to evidence presented in
MacMllan, the Curtis court considered physical evidence; the meter's malfunctioning
was caused by the removal of a ring found in defendant's garage and introduced into
evidence. With this extra bit of persuasive evidence, it was easier to uphold defend-
ant's conviction in Curtis. Factual distinctions may be very important since the "stat-
utor' inference can have no probative force independent of the factual context in
which it applies." 148 N.J. Super. at 239, 372 A.2d at 616. Yet in People v. Mc-
Laughlin, under facts more analogous to MacMillan, the New York court explicitly
upheld the constitutionality of the presumption. - Misc. 2d -, 402 N.Y.S.2d 137
(1 9)78)
Although each court depended upon "common experience" to rationalize its hold-
ing, there are no expressed differences in these experiences that account for the anti-
thetical results. Certainly geography is not the factor. The Florida court gives no
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Vagueness inherent in the more likely than not standard may also
explain the MacMillan court's dissonant holding.-7 No court has ar-
ticulated the degree of probability required to satisfy the more likely
than not test.58 Incident to this failure, wide latitude has developed
reason to expect the probability of vandalism to be greater in Miami than in the
highly urbanized states of New Jersey and New York.
The Florida court's failure to consider Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970),
may also account for the disparate results. Nowhere in the opinion did the Florida
court mention Turner, though MacLaughlin and Curtis relied upon that case heavily.
Turner is important because it recognizes distinctions between presumptions which
are logically similar.
In Turner, the Court invalidated a conviction for knowing possession of illegally
imported cocaine, but also upheld a heroin conviction that similarly required knowl-
edge of illegal importation. Holding that one could presume the requisite knowledge
in the case of heroin possession but not for cocaine, the Court made an important
distinction. In both instances, it was possible that the possessor did not know of the
drug's derivation. As to heroin, however, this possibility was very unlikely since no
heroin was produced domestically. 396 U.S. 408. This was not true for cocaine; its
legal importation accounts for a large quantity of the present cocaine supply and theft
of the substance is not uncommon. 396 U.S. at 419. Given these facts, it is legitimate
to maintain the presumption from possession of heroin since the probability is almost
100% that the drug was illegally imported. Likewise, the presumption is invalid for
cocaine possession because the possibility that the drug was not imported illegally is
much greater. According to Turner, then, a presumption may not be invalidated by
the mere possibility of its falsity. If the presumption's truth is highly probable, it is
constitutional. 396 U.S. at 408.
57. See Rebuttable Presumptions, supra note 7, at 537; Statutory Presumptions,
supra note 6, at 179. In many instances courts use the test to ensure a multitude of
constitutional rights for the defendant's protection. See note 16 and accompanying
text supra. Attempting to guarantee this protection through a single due process stan-
dard, the Supreme Court has stretched the test to its limits. Rebuttable Presunptions,
supra. Arguably, explicit adoption of the "reasonable doubt" standard would solve
many of these problems. For a discussion of Winshop requirements, see notes 31-35
and accompanying text supra. See also Statutory Presumptions, supra note 6, at 169,
in which it is stated that the use of the "reasonable doubt" standard leads to confusion
of due process questions.
58. For general background on this proposition, see Statutory Presumptions, supra
note 6, at 179, 183. It is unclear whether a correlation of 50% would be constitutional
under the more likely than not test or whether the probability must be greater than
90%, thereby approaching unification with the reasonable doubt test. When the corre-
lation is low, defendant's innocence is more likely. The accuracy of jury verdicts
based upon presumptions of low probability is suspect. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1911).
If determining the necessary strength of the presumption is purely statistical, per-
haps it should be left to the legislators who can assure consistent jury verdicts under
similar facts, not readily within the jurors' common knowledge. See Statutory Pre-
sumptions, supra note 6, at 180. Yet, when presumptions involve subjective factors
such as intent, the superiority of the legislator as a fact-finder is questionable. The
subject is not a matter within the legislature's unique expertise. Id. at 181. Statutory
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in application of the standard. 9 One court may demand a greater
degree of correlation between the proved and presumed fact than an-
other court.6" The Florida court interpreted the more likely than not
test to mandate evidence of the same strength as that required by the
reasonable doubt test.61 As a result, application of the two standards
is identical. In many instances, however, use of the stringent reason-
able doubt test either forbids criminal presumptions entirely or
reduces their prosecutorial value.62
The United States Supreme Court has not applied the more likely
than not standard in the context of utility theft presumptions,63 thus
the Florida Supreme Court is free of any binding precedent.64 In
view of the preference for predictability and uniformity in the appli-
cation of constitutional requirements, however, the Florida court
presumptions may usurp constitutionally guaranteed judicial function. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2. See general Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (deciding which
branch of government has authority in any given matter is a delicate exercise in con-
stitutional interpretation): Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (constitutional impor-
tance of the judicial function).
59. Statutory Presumptions, supra note 6, at 167, 185. See also Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973): "To the extent that the rational connection, more
likely than not, and reasonable doubt standards bear ambiguous relationships to one
another, the ambiguity is traceable in large part to variations in language and focus
rather than difference of substance."
60 Strong dissents in the Supreme Court cases in this area indicate this wide vari-
ation. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
61 Compare MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978) with Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (applications of reasonable doubt standard).
62. According to MacMillan standards, the presumed fact must almost certainly
flow from the proved fact. 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978).
The reasonable doubt test for determining due process rights is identical to the
burden of persuasion standard that forbids conviction unless all elements of an of-
fense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because of this identity, only those
presumptions of fact for which a jury would have found defendant guilty without the
use of a presumption could be deemed constitutional. Criminal Presumptions, supra
note 4, at 354.
63 No United States Supreme Court decision has dealt with this presumption.
See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishes power of
judicial review over state courts). See generally Kauper, The Supreme Court and the
Rule of Law, 59 MICH. L. REV. 531, 533-34 (1961).
64. "'State courts are the final interpreters of state law even though their actions
are reviewable under the federal Constitution." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNGi. HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-21 (1978). The state is free to de-
cide the constitutionality of its own law as long as it does not violate constitutional
principles. Id.
65. -To know the law is helpful, even when the law is bad." K. LLEWELLYN, THE
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should have distinguished and supported its unique analysis more
fully.
6 6
The MacMillan court, in its strict application of the more likely
than not test, has made an already vague standard of law more am-
biguous. 67 Even if the more stringent reasonable doubt standard is
BRAMBLE BUSH 64-66 (1951). The law should operate evenhandedly rather than arbi-
trarily. Thus, prior cases and their articulated rationales provide the most conclusive
data for courts to use in arriving at subsequent decisions. Note, Stare Decisis and the
Lower Courts: Two Recent Cases, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 504, 504-08 (1959).
66. Cf. P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 80 (6th ed. 1978) (when a
court overrules a prior case, it should do so "with care, only upon a strong basis in
reason which is explicated at the time of action, and only when it does not upset
justified reliance upon the old law"). Florida's decision has created a schism in con-
stitutional interpretation and application which needs resolution. A single national
standard is desirable if law is to have the authority and accuracy to operate as a
guiding principle for society. See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) at 10-11.
67. Ambiguity results when no logic can explain the inconsistencies between the
decisions. Other jurisdictions seeking to adopt criminal presumptions will experience
difficulty knowing what will be constitutionally acceptable. Only a ruling by the
United States Supreme Court can resolve the problem.
Additionally, the MacMillan decision spawned new legislation in Florida. Follow-
ing the decision, Florida had no statutory presumption for utility theft prosecutions
although the state's need to obtain sufficient evidence for conviction remained. In
response to this void, the state legislature enacted a new subsection to the meter theft
act. Trespass and Larceny-Utility or Cable Television Service, 1978 FLA. LAWS. Ch.
78-262, effective July 1, 1978. The new subsection requires either "knowing" altera-
tion, or use or receipt of diverted utility service "under such circumstances as would
induce a reasonable person to believe that such direct benefits have resulted from
tampering, . . . for the purpose of avoiding payment." The new legislation varies
significantly from the unconstitutional section it replaces. It does not explicitly set up
a presumption and therefore is not subject to the constitutional attack set forth in
MacMillan.
Despite Florida's attempt to avoid the difficulties of the prior legislation, some con-
stitutional problems may still inhere. On its face, the new statute appears to satisfy
requirements stated in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 (1969). The "conversion
from a . . . presumption of law approach to a circumstantial evidence approach"
provides an ideal compromise between prosecutorial needs and constitutional rights.
Abrogation of Presumptions, supra note 4, at 161. No court has yet ruled on its consti-
tutionality.
It is likely that courts will see through the purported redefinition of the offense as
an attempt to circumvent due process guarantees, and thus find the new legislation
unconstitutional. Cf. MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547 (1978) (reasoning that the
statute would be unconstitutional for the same reasons, whether the presumption was
implicit or explicit). Assuming that future courts do not follow that reasoning, addi-
tional constitutional problems may arise involving the nature of the elements that are
necessary to define a punishable crime. Arguably, the courts will interpret the new
statute to allow strict liability; even if the accused did not purposefully alter a meter,
simple possession of an altered meter under circumstances that allow a reasonable
person to find purposefulness, would allow the defendant to be found guilty. This
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presumed the proper test,6" the Florida court's use of the standard is
too severe. In terms of what the standard attempts to achieve-en-
suring due process rights while easing the prosecutorial burden-the
court's reasoning is unjustified.69 Subject to the reasonable doubt
standard, presumptions do not aid the prosecutor in establishing a
primafacie case.7" Consequently, this hinders any attempt to control
objective standard used in the new statute requires that mens rea be inferred in-
dependent of defendant's actual state of mind.
Recently, many legislatures have departed from the common law requirement that
intent be a necessary element of all criminal offenses. W. LAFAVE AND A. SCOTT, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 218-23 (1972). E.g., State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189
P.2d 993 (1948). Some scholars believe that the state has the authority to use pre-
sumptions in connection with a lesser offense when it has power to punish for the
greater offense. The application of due process tests to presumptions is considered
"grace" rather than mandate. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 4, at 180.
An essential question in this regard is whether the legislature has the authority to
declare this "lesser offense" punishable. If this new legislation is acceptable, the pros-
ecutor will achieve more convictions than under the old law because of the lower
evidentiary requirement. Compare FLA. STAT. § 812.14(c) (Supp. 1976) with 1978
Fla. Laws. Ch. 78-262. This result is ironic in light of MacMillan's attempt to protect
the criminal from arbitrary authority since the objective standard's operation in-
creases the likelihood that innocent people will be found guilty. However, it is proba-
ble that the statute will be found unconstitutional; to punish conduct without
reference to the actor's state of mind is unjust. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra, at 221-22.
Although the statute contains reference to state of mind, it is not defendant's actual
state of mind, but rather an objective one founded upon the reasonable person, not
the accused.
Whatever its constitutional interpretation, the MacMillan decision and its attendant
legislative response may have prevented other states from adopting statutes similar to
that of New Jersey or New York in order to avoid court battles and the risk of uncon-
stitutionality.
68 See notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
69 Reasonable doubt does not mean that the jury should not convict if there is a
minute possibility of innocence. It should do so only when the doubt is reasonable.
Compare MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978) with State v. Curtis, 148
N J. Super. 235. 372 A.2d 612 (1977) (Curtis rejected the possibility of innocence
while MacMillan relied upon it). In light of the cases that found defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, denial of the presumptions' validity in MacMillan is not
warranted. Since the presumptions used did not require the jury to find guilt unless it
lound guilt as to all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it would appear that accord-
ing to the jurors' "common experience," the presumptions met the constitutional re-
quirements of due process.
The reality of the situation however, may negate this view. A presumption typi-
cally operates where there is no other evidence of the presumed fact. Therefore, the
jury is likely to accept the presumption without making an independent assessment of
its validity, See Statutor' Presumptions, supra note 6, at 169.
70, See note 63 and accompanying text supra.
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the meter theft problem and creates a need for alternative solutions. 7'
Finally, should other courts accept the reasoning in MacMillan, stat-
utory presumptions in other areas of criminal law could be banned as
unconstitutional. 72
Rene M Friedman
71. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
Alternatives to the legislation discussed might include: 1) design tamper-proof me-
ters; 2) create investigative systems to discover tampered meters; 3) explore civil reme-
dies, such as allowing treble damages; 4) establish governmental subsidies for utility
costs, as there are many persons who simply cannot afford the high utility costs; 5)
provide governmental subsidies for defendants to investigate the validity of a pre-
sumption and to employ expert witnesses to adequately rebut presumptions; and 6)
utilize computer data of the probabilities that any presumption might be true in a
case, given certain individual variables unique to that case. See generally Abrogation
of Presumptions, supra note 4, at 186.
72. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 4, at 183; Statutory Presumptions, supra
note 6, at 181.
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